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Pragmatic Rationality and Risk*
Claire Finkelstein
Pragmatic theories focus on whether agents fare better acting on the basis of
a particular intention or plan, rather than whether this can be justiﬁed in terms of
the expected utility associated with the plan. This article argues that, while attractive, pragmatic theories have difﬁculty vindicating the rationality of plans involving an element of risk. In “Assure and Threaten,” David Gauthier noticed this difﬁculty with respect to deterrent threats. This article argues that the same difﬁculty
exists for assurances involving an element of risk. It then explores whether Pragmatists could solve the shortcomings of their approach by adopting the Chance
Beneﬁt Thesis, namely, the thesis that a chance of beneﬁt is itself a beneﬁt.

I. OPTIMAL PLANS AND THEIR SUBOPTIMAL SUBPARTS
Much recent work on practical rationality has focused on intentions and
actions in the lives of rational creatures. A common starting point for discussion is the observation that intentions have many of the characteristics
of plans. More precisely, intentions appear to be partial plans, in that they
require the formation of other, more immediate intentions for their fulﬁllment.1 By forming intentions and planning for the future in light of those
intentions, a rational agent reasons in stages: she ﬁrst settles on a plan that
is optimal in light of her beliefs and desires and then restricts her reasoning to actions that will contribute to the execution of that prior plan. I shall
call plans that are optimal in light of an agent’s beliefs and desires “optimal
plans.” A practically rational agent, then, is someone who ﬁrst restrains the
intentions she forms to the conﬁnes of optimal plans and who then constrains her actions to those particular intentions.
* I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Geoff Brennan, Michael Finkelstein, David Gauthier,
Joe Mintoff, Christopher Morris, Connie Rosati, Seana Shiffrin, and Bruno Verbeek for their
helpful comments at various stages in the drafting of this article and also audiences at York
University, the University of Newcastle ðAustraliaÞ, and the University of Pennsylvania philosophy department.
1. Michael Bratman has most compellingly articulated the role of plans in practical reasoning. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987Þ.
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There is a complication, however. Sometimes the optimal plan will
require an agent to perform actions that are not, in and of themselves,
optimal. Indeed, sometimes the optimal plan requires actions that are
distinctly suboptimal in execution. The need to perform individual suboptimal actions, however, does not threaten the optimality of the plan. As
long as the agent is better off under the plan than had he never adopted
the plan in the ﬁrst place, the plan remains optimal.
In the usual case, the actions I must perform to realize my plans have
instrumental value: they are a means to realizing something else I value.
But the relation between my plan and the actions required by my plan
is not always instrumental. In some cases, the suboptimal action I must
perform to realize my plan must be performed after the beneﬁts of the
plan have already accrued. The question such cases raise is whether it is
rational for an agent to perform an action required by an optimal plan
when the action is not instrumentally required to achieve the beneﬁts of
the plan.
Consider the case of the so-called Humean farmers. Alfred’s ﬁeld is
ready for plowing this week, and Bertram’s ﬁeld will be ready next week.
Neither farmer can plow his ﬁeld by himself. And both would be better
off helping the other and receiving help himself that he would be in the
absence of any reciprocal arrangement between them. Alfred proposes
that Bertram help him plow his ﬁeld now, and in exchange Alfred will
help Bertram next week. Is it rational for Bertram to accept Alfred’s offer?
That depends on whether it is rational for Alfred to keep his promise to
help plow Bertram’s ﬁeld next week: if it is not rational for Alfred to plow
Bertram’s ﬁeld, it is not rational for Bertram to render assistance ﬁrst,
given that this would likely result in Bertram’s ﬁnding himself worse off
than he would be in the absence of an agreement with Alfred in the ﬁrst
place. The rationality of the exchange thus depends on whether it is rational for Alfred to plow Bertram’s ﬁeld once Alfred has already secured
Bertram’s assistance with his own ﬁeld.
In order to address the interesting problem cases of this sort raise,
we must make the following assumptions: First, Alfred would achieve no
reputational beneﬁts from plowing Bertram’s ﬁeld, nor any other intangible beneﬁt that would alter the payoffs from plowing. Second, there
will be no future course of dealings between Alfred and Bertram that
would make it advantageous for them to cooperate now. Third, there is no
legal or other coercive enforcement of an agreement the two farmers
might make. Any agreement between them must be adhered to on the
basis of considerations of rationality endogenous to the plan. Fourth,
common knowledge of rationality obtains between the parties, meaning
that each individual is rational and each has knowledge of each other’s
rationality. The question, then, is whether it is rational for Alfred and
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Bertram to enter into a sincere agreement to assist one another with
plowing, and to maintain that agreement in the face of considerations that
speak in favor of defection, pursuant to a mutual cooperation agreement
the two might make.
As is well known, the standard economic approach to rationality
maintains that cooperation is not rational under these circumstances.
Once next week has arrived, Alfred will have nothing to gain and everything to lose by helping Bertram. While he does better under the bargain
with Bertram than he would without it, there are no further gains to Alfred from abiding by the agreement after Bertram has performed. Alfred
will not plow Bertram’s ﬁeld next week; therefore, since Bertram knows
that Alfred is rational, Bertram will not agree to the exchange.2
In this paper, I shall explore some aspects of an alternative answer to
the problem the farmers face and others of its ilk. David Gauthier, Edward McClennen, and others have advanced what they call the “pragmatic” theory of rationality, namely, a view that assesses the rationality
of an act or plan by its ultimate utility to the agent.3 Proponents of the
pragmatic theory accordingly hold that a plan that leaves an agent worse
off than another available plan cannot be rational to adopt. It is rational
for Alfred to plan to help Bertram plow his ﬁeld next week, since under
that plan, Alfred would be better off than in the absence of the plan,
which would result in his plowing his ﬁeld alone. The pragmatic account
will thus diverge from standard expected utility theory in cases in which
the plan that will make an agent’s life go best requires him to perform acts
that are not best, considered in isolation from a broader course of action.
Since agents who optimize over plans rather than over individual acts can
expect to fare better than agents who attempt to maximize act by act, the
rational agent has pragmatic reasons to perform suboptimal actions in cases
where required to carry out optimal plans. This may be so, even if those
actions do not bear an instrumental relation to the beneﬁts from the plan.

2. This is the standard economic result in this kind of situation, but a caveat is in order.
The standard theory maintains that if there is repeat play, the parties should be able to cooperate, because a tit-for-tat strategy is more rational than defection. This result, however, depends on the repetition being open ended. If the parties are aware of when their interactions
will end there is a problem of backward induction: neither party has an incentive to cooperate
on the nth play, and that means the other party has no incentive to cooperate on the n 2 1st
play, and so on. For more on the problem of backward induction, see Phillip Pettit and Robert
Sugden, “The Backward Induction Paradox,” Journal of Philosophy 86 ð1989Þ: 169–82.
3. Edward F. McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990Þ, and “Pragmatic Rationality and Rules,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 26 ð1997Þ: 210–58; David Gauthier, “Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A
Critique and a Defense,” Noûs 31 ð1997Þ: 1–25, “Assure and Threaten,” Ethics 104 ð1991Þ:
690–721.
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Pragmatists differ in their approaches to practical reasoning.4 I have
compared these differing accounts elsewhere, and I will not repeat that
discussion here.5 Instead I wish to focus on one approach to the pragmatic
account, namely, that of David Gauthier. For Gauthier, the form of practical reasoning that accompanies his commitment to the pragmatic approach is constrained maximization: the pragmatic approach to rationality dictates the plans it is optimal to adopt, and constrained maximization
is the form of reasoning that allows agents to implement them. Because
human beings have the ability to constrain their maximizing, it is rational
for them to adopt optimal plans, even when those plans require them to
perform actions that are not, considered in and of themselves, maximizing.
Gauthier has famously endorsed the rationality of constrained maximization, but that thesis has taken different forms at different points in
his career. In particular, the shift from the dispositional view in Morals by
Agreement to the plan-based view in “Assure and Threaten” and other
post–Morals by Agreement papers was an important evolution in his thinking about practical rationality.6 In his article for the present symposium,
we have a further development: the move from constrained maximization
as the basis for implementing rational plans generally to direct optimization in the context of interpersonal coordination. The aspect of Gauthier’s
theory I wish to discuss is, as far as I can tell, unaffected by the transition
from constrained maximization to optimization. It would not be relevant
on the dispositional account of constrained maximization proposed in Morals by Agreement, as I shall explain. But since I take that version of the theory
to be thoroughly abandoned, and for good reasons, I regard the topic as an
abiding concern for Gauthier’s mature view of practical reason.
The subject on which I shall focus is the pragmatist’s ability to cope
with plans involving an element of risk and, in particular, the Gautherian
pragmatist’s difﬁculty with this topic. As will become clear, the features of
Gauthier’s account that produce the problem with risk are common to
all defensible pragmatic accounts. The only accounts that are both pragmatic and do not suffer from difﬁculty accounting for risky plans are indefensible for other reasons, comparable to the drawbacks inherent in the
dispositional view of practical reasoning spelled out in Morals by Agreement.
Therefore the only defensible form of pragmatism is that which Gauthier
defends in his post–Morals by Agreement papers. But that version of the theory has a fundamental problem with plans containing elements of risk.
While the best versions of pragmatic theories of rationality have a promising solution to the difﬁculties of expected utility theory, their attractiveness
4. Proponents include David Gauthier, Ned McClennen, Joe Mintoff, Gregory Kavka,
Michael Bratman, Scott Shapiro.
5. Claire Finkelstein, “Acting on an Intention,” in Reason and Intentions, ed. Bruno Verbeek ðBurlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008Þ.
6. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1986Þ.
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is limited by their difﬁculties accounting for the rationality of plans where
the beneﬁts under the plan are less than certain to accrue.
In the literature on the pragmatic account, there is only one sustained discussion of this problem of which I am aware, and that is Gauthier’s account of the rationality of plans involving deterrent threats in
“Assure and Threaten.”7 Gauthier noticed a difference in the rational characteristics of threats and assurances, one that seemed to make the gains
from cooperation inapplicable to deterrent threats. Several solutions to
this problem appear in the literature, but none seems to solve the difﬁculty. This in turn casts doubt on the pragmatic theory, given that it appears
to be unable to vindicate the rationality of plans involving deterrent threats.
In this article, I shall suggest that the difﬁculty Gauthier noticed with plans
involving deterrent threats generalizes to any plan involving less than certain beneﬁts. Given the failure of the various solutions Gauthier has explored to that problem, the element of chance in a plan poses a hurdle to
the pragmatic account.
In the second half of the article I explore the suggestion that the
pragmatist may be able to make his account immune to the asymmetry between sure plans and gambles if he adopts a certain thesis about beneﬁt:
the thesis that an ex ante chance of beneﬁt is itself a beneﬁt. I call this the
Chance Beneﬁt Thesis. I then make a stronger claim: the pragmatist’s only
reasonable hope for solving the problem of risky plans lies in the plausibility of the Chance Beneﬁt Thesis. After considering several arguments
for and against the Chance Beneﬁt Thesis, I reach a weak conclusion in
its favor, despite remaining concerns about its plausibility. The strongest
conclusion of the article, however, is that if the Chance Beneﬁt Thesis
turns out to be indefensible, the objection to the pragmatic account I present here will constitute a sufﬁcient basis for its rejection.
II. PRAGMATIC RATIONALITY AND THE
DELIBERATIVE REQUIREMENT
The expected utility theorist denies that it is rational for Bertram to help
Alfred plow his ﬁeld, given that Alfred cannot provide any assurance to
Bertram that he will reciprocate. The pragmatist disagrees. Assume, he
argues, that Alfred and Bertram are both rational, and that each knows
the other is rational. Then it cannot be rational for Alfred to agree to reciprocate but plan not to. For if this were rational, Bertram would know
this and would not cooperate with Alfred. The common knowledge assumption effectively rules out asymmetrical solutions; it makes it impossible for Alfred to take advantage of a course of action without Bertram also
knowing that Alfred would adopt it. The pragmatist argues, therefore, that
7. See Gauthier, “Assure and Threaten,” 709–17.
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if common knowledge obtains, there are only two feasible outcomes in
reciprocation cases such as these: both cooperate or neither does. And
given that Alfred can expect to do better with cooperation than without
it, it is rational for Alfred to cooperate and, hence, rational for Bertram
to count on Alfred’s cooperation.
Some responses to this sort of case seek to vindicate the rationality
of performing suboptimal actions in satisfaction of optimal plans by suggesting that it is sometimes rational to act irrationally. Gauthier himself
defended this view at one time.8 Such accounts are manifestly misguided,
however, and they have few adherents now. What we want instead is a defense of the claim that suboptimal actions that are part of, though not instrumentally related to, optimal plans may be rational to perform, rather
than rationally-motivated irrationality. How might such a view be defended?
One way to defend the rationality of suboptimal acts is to think of rational plan execution as a two-step process, one that is dependent not
only on the agent’s formation of an optimal plan, but on the agent’s selfmotivated execution of that plan on the basis of his reasons for acting.
Unlike the earlier accounts that modeled suboptimal actions as irrational, this approach would treat both plan formation and plan execution
as requiring rational justiﬁcation. Rational agents must have an all-thingsconsidered reason not only for adopting the plan in the ﬁrst place but also
for carrying through with its dictates. Whether or not the agent reconsiders a plan is irrelevant, on this view. If an action is rationally justiﬁed, reconsideration should not lead to a change of plans, assuming the situation
is as the agent expected it to be. For this reason, it should not be necessary
in the correct theory of plan adoption and execution to posit a mechanism ðpsychological or otherÞ to block reconsideration. A rational agent
who reconsiders has reason to implement her plan: she has an argument
to defeat temptations when reconsideration threatens to lead her astray.
On this view, plan execution is a thoroughly deliberative affair, as
subject to the agent’s decision making as the initial decision to form the
intention or adopt the plan in the ﬁrst place. I refer elsewhere to the requirement that a theory of rationality explain the performance of rational
actions in a way that appeals to the reason or deliberation of the agent
the “deliberative” requirement.9 I shall adopt that terminology here. The
deliberative requirement rules out external precommitment mechanisms.
As in the case of Ulysses who tied himself to the mast, it will also rule out
what we might call “semiautomatic” devices a rational agent might use in
order to mirror the effects of precommitment, but without the external
8. David Gauthier, “Rationality and the Rational Aim,” in Reading Parﬁt, ed. Jonathan
Dancy ðOxford: Blackwell, 1997Þ.
9. I spell out some of these consequences in “Is Risk a Harm?” University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 151 ð2003Þ: 963 –1001, 963.
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restraint. Semiautomatic mechanisms include habits, cooperative or other
sorts of dispositions, internal resolution that operates solely by blocking
reconsideration, rationally induced endogenous preference changes, and
so forth. On such accounts, the move that blocks reconsideration is nondeliberative, usually in a semiautomatic way, and therefore plan execution
must be a separate matter from plan adoption, which clearly cannot be
nondeliberative. But once one has a fully deliberative account of nonreconsideration, the need for a separate theory itself drops out. What the
agent needs is a rational basis for proceeding with the prior plan he or
she has already adopted.
Once an agent has a rational basis for acting of this sort, it does not
particularly matter whether she reconsiders: if she does, she will decide in
favor of proceeding with the previously formed intention for precisely
the same reason she adopted the plan in the ﬁrst place. What this means
for reciprocation cases is that we need an account that can explain how
farmer Alfred can have a reason for actually plowing Bertram’s ﬁeld. It is
not necessary to explain the rationality of not reconsidering his intention
to plow Bertram’s ﬁeld once formed.
The deliberative requirement does not place any constraints on the
kind of reason that will qualify in this regard; it merely says that there
must be some such reason. But insofar as the pragmatist is articulating
a theory of rationality, there are restrictions beyond the deliberative requirement, restrictions about what kinds of reason could count as rationalizing Alfred’s plowing of Bertram’s ﬁeld. A theory of rationality, for
example, cannot appeal to moral reasons for this purpose, though moral
reasons would satisfy the deliberative requirement. A further restriction
on the kinds of explanations a pragmatist can offer, then, is that the reasons to which agents appeal must be reasons of self-interest. It may be that
in following reasons of self-interest, the pragmatically motivated agent will
behave morally as well, insofar as his reason would lead him to keep promises, to cooperate with others, and so forth. But the conformity to moral
norms would then be a side beneﬁt of adherence to the pragmatic theory
of rationality. It would not itself be a reason for adopting such a theory.
Proceeding against the background of both the deliberative requirement and the maximizing conception of rationality, there would appear
to be only one version of the pragmatic theory that ﬁts our desiderata: the
account of rationality for which Gauthier argues in his essays post–Morals
by Agreement.10 In those papers, Gauthier argues that an agent should conform to the dictates of a plan if and only if by her lights she is better off
under the plan than she would have been had she never adopted the plan
at all. An agent who follows this principle executes her plans rationally,
10. These papers constitute a rejection of the Morals by Agreement account. David Gauthier,
“Intention and Deliberation,” in Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution, ed. P. Danielson
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meaning that there is a reason that guides her deliberative faculties during both plan execution and plan formation. The theory therefore satisﬁes the deliberative requirement, and the content of the reason satisﬁes the rationality constraint. Indeed, this test is the only way a pragmatist
can vindicate the rationality of performing suboptimal actions in the kind
of case we are considering, consistent with the deliberate requirement. For
given the basic assumption that human beings are rational maximizers, the
deliberative requirement can only be satisﬁed if, in executing a plan, the
agent can see herself as better off under the plan than she would have
been in its absence. Gauthier calls a plan that satisﬁes this condition “fully
conﬁrmed.”
Full conﬁrmation is thus the practical rationality equivalent of an
agent’s being disposed in the Morals by Agreement model to cooperate with
others, namely, having the disposition of a constrained maximizer. In the
Morals by Agreement model, constraining one’s maximizing in accordance
with optimal plans is rational, even if this requires disposing oneself to
perform actions that are not, in and of themselves, maximizing. Reaping
the gains of cooperation in reciprocation games and prisoner’s dilemmas
cannot be achieved without forming certain kinds of dispositions under
this model. But actions performed on the basis of dispositions are not
deliberatively based and thus fail to satisfy the deliberative requirement.
Gauthier’s post–Morals by Agreement notion of full conﬁrmation, by contrast, does satisfy the deliberative principle, and this gives us a seemingly
attractive way of cashing out the optimality condition the pragmatist endorses.11 I shall accordingly say that the post–Morals by Agreement approach
to constrained maximizing, based as it is on reﬂective execution of optimal plans, satisﬁes the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle.
According to the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle, when the time
comes for Alfred to decide whether to make good on his promise, he
should ask himself how he would have fared had he never entered into
the agreement with Bertram in the ﬁrst place. He should compare this
to the position he is in under the terms of the agreement, counting the
costs of compliance. Without the agreement, he would be left to plow his
ﬁeld by himself, but he would not have to plow Bertram’s ﬁeld. With the
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1998Þ, 41–54, “Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A
Critique and a Defence,” Noûs 31 ð1997Þ: 1–25, 20, “Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the
Rationality of Plans,” in Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behavior, ed. Francesco Farina, Frank
Hahn, and Stefano Vannucci ðOxford: Clarendon, 1996Þ, 217–43, “Individual Reason,” in
Reason, Ethics and Society, ed. J. B. Schneewind ðChicago: Open Court Press, 1996Þ, 39–57,
and “Assure and Threaten.”
11. Gauthier says a plan is “conﬁrmed” at a given time, “if at that time the agent may
reasonably expect to do better continuing it than she would have expected to do had she not
adopted it.” See Gauthier, “Intention and Deliberation,” 49.
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agreement, he has the cost of plowing Bertram’s ﬁeld, along with the beneﬁt of Bertram’s assistance. When he compares his life under the plan
with his life in the absence of the plan, he sees he is better off with the plan
than without it. Under these conditions, it is rational to follow through
with the plan.
There are many objections to the pragmatic account in the philosophical literature, and many answers to those objections. It is not my purpose, however, to offer a general defense of the pragmatic account. My
aim instead is to highlight a very particular problem with the pragmatic account, one that threatens to make any victory over expected utility theory
a pyrrhic one, namely, that the pragmatist has difﬁculty defending the merits of plan execution where the beneﬁts from the plan are less than fully
certain to accrue. Some pragmatic accounts appear to address this problem
effectively, but to date all such accounts have either implicitly or explicitly
assumed a nondeliberative method of plan execution. My point can thus
be put as follows: once the deliberative requirement is fully accommodated, it becomes difﬁcult for the pragmatist to deal effectively with risky
plans without turning back to standard expected utility theory. This poses a
serious challenge to the pragmatic account.
III. RISKY ASSURANCES
Sometimes the optimal plan is one that requires an agent to gamble. No
matter how risk averse the agent, there will be some plans involving gambles whose expected beneﬁts are sufﬁciently high and whose risks are sufﬁciently low, that a rational agent would regard the plan as optimal. The
problem for the pragmatist is that if the gamble fails, the actor will have
to perform suboptimal acts required by a plan knowing that the beneﬁts
she hoped for in adopting the plan will never accrue. In such cases, the
pragmatist will not be able to vindicate the rationality of particular acts
by turning to the beneﬁts of the plan, since the plan will not in fact have
left the agent better off than she would have been had she never adopted
the plan in the ﬁrst place. For a rational agent following the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle, it cannot be rational to stick to the plan in the case
in which the agent loses the gamble, since this would make the agent’s life
go worse, rather than better overall.12 If following a plan would make the
agent’s life go worse, she cannot rationally justify performing any suboptimal act required by it, since there can be no reason for performing such
acts—neither the plan nor the payoff from the act itself supplies one.
12. Notice that the economist has no particular difﬁculty with risky plans. For his
position is that it is not rational to implement a plan that calls for a suboptimal act if the
latter is not a means to the promised gains from the plan, and that if the act is a means, the
act is rational. In no event does it matter whether the act must be performed in the face of
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Suppose the situation the farmers face is like this. Alfred’s ﬁeld is
twice as large as Bertram’s. Alfred, therefore, proposes that Bertram give
him, Alfred, a .5 chance of receiving Bertram’s assistance, in exchange
for a deﬁnite commitment on Alfred’s part to plow Bertram’s ﬁeld next
week. Let us assume Alfred does not have any particular preference with
regard to risk; he is risk neutral. Where does the rationality of their agreement stand in this case? On the one hand, both parties should regard this
deal as advantageous if the original proposal was, since each has the same
expected utility he had under the original set of circumstances. But suppose Alfred ﬂips a coin to determine whether Bertram will help plow his
ﬁeld, and he loses. Under the terms of the agreement, Bertram will not
help Alfred plow his ﬁeld, but Alfred must still plow Bertram’s next week.
Is it rational for Alfred to follow through with the plan and proceed to
plow Bertram’s ﬁeld as promised?
According to the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle, it is not. For when
Alfred now asks himself whether his life will go better under the plan than
it would have gone had he never adopted the plan in the ﬁrst place, he
will have to answer the counterfactual test in the negative. Alfred now desperately wishes he had not entered into the agreement, for it has turned
out to be all cost and no gain to him. And given common knowledge of rationality, Bertram knows it is not rational for Alfred to reciprocate should
he lose the gamble. The agreement is not rational for Bertram either. The
Pragmatic Deliberative Principle thus seems to fail as applied to reciprocation cases, at least if the assurance involves less than certain payoffs.
In “Assure and Threaten,” Gauthier partially notices the pragmatist’s
difﬁculty with risk, but only in the context of threats.13 What drives the article is the concern that under the pragmatic theory, it cannot be rational
for a person to threaten another to deter him from doing something if
making good on the threat would be costly for the person issuing the
threat. Should the threat fail to deter, he cannot ðrationallyÞ carry out his
threat, since the threat will turn out to have been all cost and no gain.
But given the possibility of risky assurances we have identiﬁed, the problem applies equally to assurances. One way to put the point is in terms of
the deliberative requirement: plans involving deterrent threats and risky
assurances cannot be rational to adopt if they must be deliberatively executed, since a rational agent cannot know whether her life will in fact go
better under the plan.
certain or uncertain gains. The economist will thus endorse entering into certain gambles
but will see no reason to make good on those gambles in the absence of some precommitment mechanism. Whether one wins or loses a gamble is irrelevant to the rationality of carrying on as the plan requires.
13. See Gauthier, “Assure and Threaten,” 709–13.
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This seems to suggest that the only way to vindicate the rationality of
plans involving risk is in expected beneﬁt terms, namely, in terms of the increased chances of achieving the sought for beneﬁt. But expected beneﬁt
calculations will not rationalize performing a costly action in fulﬁllment
of a plan that must be deliberatively performed, if the action does not have
autonomous beneﬁts. So expected beneﬁt based justiﬁcations require automatic or semiautomatic plan execution. Adoption of automatic or semiautomatic methods of plan execution is not consistent with the deliberative requirement—a fundamental condition of rational agency.
Thus far I have stuck with what I take to be Gauthier’s original approach to resolute choice, namely, the one that most immediately replaced
the dispositional account of Morals by Agreement. But we have now to bring
on board his attempted solution to the problem of the rationality of plans
involving deterrent threats in “Assure and Threaten.” If it had succeeded,
Gauthier’s only mistake would have been his failure to extend that solution to the problem of risky assurances. But as I have already suggested,
the solution appears to fail. The difﬁculties here will be instructive.
IV. THE POLICY APPROACH
On Gauthier’s approach, it is irrational to issue threats that would be costly
for the issuer to execute. It might nevertheless be rational to have a policy
of issuing and making good on such threats. While no single threat is certain to pay off, a policy of threat issuance and execution seems more promising. Having such a policy, after all, allows an agent to use threat issuance
as an effective means of convincing others to adhere to her demands. The
original pragmatic deliberative approach would thus require only a slight
modiﬁcation: rational agents should select actions in accordance with optimal policies instead of with optimal plans. In order to determine whether
to adopt a given policy, the rational agent should use the familiar counterfactual test: he should ask himself whether he is better off under the
policy overall than he would be in its absence, taking into account the
costs of making good on a particular deterrent threat. If the answer is “yes,”
then it is rational for the agent to follow through on a plan involving that
threat, since making good on the threat constitutes the execution of a policy
of threat issuance and threat execution it was rational to adopt.
Unfortunately, this move to a higher level of generality does not solve
the difﬁculty with deliberative execution of suboptimal actions. Just as the
appeal to plans unravels when rational agents are confronted with a ﬁnite
number of iterations of cooperative behavior, so moving to the higher
level of abstraction involved in reasoning from policy revives the problem
we saw in the context of plans: if a given mode of reasoning say, reasoning
from policies, would require me to do something that is not itself utility
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maximizing, it is rational to reject it. But just as David Lyons showed for the
relation of act to rule utilitarianism,14 it is always possible to alter my mode
of reasoning just slightly to incorporate exceptions to a general policy,
thus forming a new, improved policy that is better contextualized to maximize utility. For this reason it cannot be rational to adopt a mode of reasoning that recommends suboptimal acts. Alternatively we should be able
to trade in one policy for a “better” policy from the standpoint of expected
utility theory—one that alters just the suboptimal act in question.
There is a second problem that is speciﬁc to the policy approach
Gauthier proposes in “Assure and Threaten,” one I think Gauthier himself has accepted as fatal to any attempt to rationalize deterrent threats on
the basis of reasoning from optimal policies.15 When a rational agent decides to adopt a policy of threat issuance and threat execution, she cannot
be certain that implementing the policy will in fact make her life go better
than not adopting the policy at all. Though adherence to a policy of following through on deterrent threats is likely to result in the issuance of
effective deterrent threats, it might turn out that no threat ever actually
succeeds in deterring, given that the recipient of these threats might always resist. Adopting the policy would then leave the agent worse off than
had she not adopted it at all.16 If we consider the rationality of a threat
policy ex ante, we cannot assume it is rational to adhere to a policy of making good on deterrent threats.
Third, there is a problem of “backward induction” that will plague
any effort to account for threat execution in terms of policies. Suppose
we know how many instances of threat issuance and execution we will
encounter under a given policy. Then on the last instance of the series, a
given individual will have no reason to make good on his deterrent threat,
because there will be nothing further to be gained from his doing so, and
following through on the threat will no longer undermine the policy of
threat issuance and execution that seems advantageous when in the midst
of the policy. Following through on the last threat will be all cost and no
gain. So in a policy with n threats, it makes sense to stop executing threats
issued on the n 2 1 threat. If this is true, however, then it is not rational to
issue the nth threat, since against the background of common knowledge
of rationality, the recipient of the nth threat will know it is not rational to
execute that threat, and so will not be deterred. But now that we have dis14. David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism ðNew York: Oxford University Press,
1965Þ.
15. Unpublished exchange with David Gauthier. The argument is one originally noted
by Joe Mintoff, in a correspondence he had many years ago with Gauthier after the publication of “Assure and Threaten.”
16. True, if an agent suddenly happens to ﬁnd herself in the middle of a policy which
has already proven beneﬁcial, she can appeal to the beneﬁts of a policy in order to justify making good on a particular threat.
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pensed with the rationality of making good on the nth threat, we will encounter the same problem with respect to the n 2 1 threat, and then with
the n 2 2 threat, and so on down the line. Thus we can eliminate all rational threat execution under the policy by backward induction.
A defense against the backward induction argument would be that
we do not normally know how many instances of threat issuance and
execution would be necessary under a rational threat policy. It is more
realistic to suppose that any such policy will be open ended. But it is not
necessary to know which of the threats I issue will be the last one for the
backward induction objection to apply. It is enough to know there will be
a last threat for the problem to arise: if I know that the number of threats
is ﬁnite, I know that the last threat, whenever it is, will not be rational to
issue, as well as the threat before that, back to the ﬁrst threat. Thus the
mere knowledge that the number of threats is ﬁnite will start the backward induction, and eliminate the rationality of appealing to a policy of
threat issuance and execution. Since the ﬁnitude of any approach to
practical reasoning can be inferred from our mortality, it appears that the
appeal to policy will fail.17
For the foregoing reasons, then, the move from rational plan adoption and execution to rational policy adoption does not appear to solve
the difﬁculties raised by the rationality of following through on failed deterrent threats. And given the parallel between deterrent threats and risky
assurances, the turn to policy will not help to rationalize the issuance and
execution of risky assurances either. So the problem with the rationality of
threats Gauthier identiﬁed in “Assure and Threaten” is indeed serious, and
we are left without a solution.
V. THE CHANCE BENEFIT SOLUTION
Because of the backward induction problem discussed in the preceding
section, Gauthier eventually concluded that the notion of a policy cannot
vindicate the rationality of plans involving deterrent threats. That conclusion seems fundamentally sound against the background of Gauthier’s
approach to rationality: plans involving deterrent threats may require the
person issuing the threat to perform a suboptimal act—make good on
the threat—if the threat fails to deter. Not only is following through on
the threat suboptimal, as it is with assurances, but the plan as a whole
will have failed to yield any beneﬁt. Thus unlike for assurances, where de17. It might be argued that the relevant knowledge is not the ﬁnitude of the chain of
threats, but knowing, for any given threat, that it is the last threat. But this seems incorrect.
For given the backward induction, I know not only that it is irrational for me to issue the last
threat, whenever it is, and that this makes it irrational for me to issue the n 2 1 threat, and
the n 2 2 threat, and so on, then I know that wherever the threat I am about to issue falls in
the series, it is irrational to issue.
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terrent threats are concerned, it is not possible to vindicate the rationality
of otherwise suboptimal actions by reference to the larger plan of which
they are a part.
It is not surprising, then, that embedding the suboptimal plan in a still
more general entity—a policy of threat issuance and threat execution—
does not improve matters. Just as the plan may turn out to be suboptimal
if the threat fails to deter, so the policy may turn out to be suboptimal if
the policy fails to deter.
As we have seen, if dispositions supply the relevant “mode of reasoning,” instead of policies, matters are otherwise: since dispositions are
largely self-executing, acts done on the basis of dispositions need not have
positive payoffs for rational agents to perform them. Actions performed
on the basis of dispositions, however, do not satisfy the deliberative requirement.18 They therefore do not count as “rational actions” in the relevant sense and so cannot solve the problem of the rationality of deterrent
threats or risky assurances either.
Let us then return to the counterfactual test as Gauthier originally
formulated it and ask whether there are other possible solutions to the
problem posed by threats and risky assurances. Recall the original problem we faced with risky assurances. Suppose the payoffs for Alfred are
as follows: receive help and render no help ð16Þ, exchange help ð12Þ, receive no help and render no help ð5Þ, render help and receive no help
ð1Þ. Alfred’s baseline ðhis payoff in the absence of any agreementÞ is 5,
because that is the payoff from defecting from the cooperative scheme
ðrender no helpÞ, which would imply that the agent also receives no help.
In the game tree depicted in ﬁgure 1, only Alfred’s utilities are represented.
Call “receiving no help” reneging. We treat the ﬁrst node of the game tree
as a chance node, because whether Bertram cooperates or defects from
their agreement is not under Alfred’s control. Therefore we treat Alfred
as “winning” if Bertram reciprocates, and as losing if he does not. We can
then model the payoffs for Alfred as shown in ﬁgure 1.
Alfred’s preferred outcome is of course to receive help and to renege,
since it would give him a payoff of 16. But this outcome is not available to
him, since against the background of common knowledge of rationality,
we can assume that he will not receive help if it is rational for him to renege after he has done so. So the next best available outcome would be
for Alfred to win the gamble and to make good on his promise by cooperating with Bertram ðfor a payoff of 12Þ. Since the position he would be
in were he to forgo the agreement altogether is 5, he can tell himself he is
18. At least this is the case on Gauthier’s account of dispositions. While it might be
possible to hold a view of dispositions that made them compatible with deliberation, such an
account would encounter the same difﬁculty with the rational justiﬁcation for the acts recommended by the disposition that we saw with policies and plans.
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FIG. 1

better off than he would have been had he never agreed to reciprocate.
The problem is that if he loses the gamble, making good on his promise would leave him worse off than he would have been without the agreement, since he would end up with a payoff of 1. In this case, the agreement
to cooperate with Bertram does not satisfy the pragmatic deliberative principle, and it would not be rational for him to reciprocate. Since Alfred
knows this in advance, he cannot commit to following through should he
lose the gamble. The result is that he cannot sincerely promise to reciprocate, and Bertram cannot trust Alfred to reciprocate. Bertram will refuse
to plow Alfred’s ﬁeld.
On Gauthier’s account, reciprocation is not rational unless Alfred
can see himself as beneﬁted by the agreement with Bertram. But how can
he see himself as beneﬁted if he is on the losing end of a risky assurance
or deterrent threat? It seems he cannot. The only other option we have
seen so far is for the plan to be at least partially self-executing, as it might
be if it were to be executed on the basis of dispositions. But the account
would then fail the deliberative requirement, and arguments in favor of
retaining that requirement are strong.
There is, however, a possibility we have not yet considered, one that
makes use of the notion of chance beneﬁt we earlier deﬁned. If there is
such a thing as chance beneﬁt, a person who loses a gamble may still have
been beneﬁted: she has been beneﬁted by the chance of beneﬁt the gamble afforded her. Thus if the .5 chance farmer Alfred had to secure Bertram’s assistance is a beneﬁt in and of itself, this would enable him in some
cases of risky assurances to still see himself as better off under the agreement with Bertram, come what may. And this is true even if Alfred loses the
gamble. Chance beneﬁt is a thin gain as compared with actually winning
the gamble outright—a notion we will refer to as outcome beneﬁt. Still, if
the chance beneﬁt is large enough, Bertram’s welfare might be improved,
relative to his starting position, on the losing branch of the gamble.
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But isn’t chance beneﬁt just a chance of receiving some quantum of
outcome beneﬁt? And if so, how could it do any independent work in
deﬁning the payoffs of a gamble? Instead of rejecting this idea out of
hand, let us consider what would have to be the case for chance beneﬁt
to function in this way. For chance beneﬁt to have value in the way we are
exploring, it must persist when outcome beneﬁt fails to materialize. We
might more naturally, however, think of chance beneﬁt as absorbed into
the outcome beneﬁt when a person wins the gamble. To have a basis for rejecting that absorption of chance beneﬁt into outcome beneﬁt, we would
have to think of the chance of winning as itself a beneﬁt. Is this plausible?
The idea seems perhaps less far-fetched when one considers the
same kind of idea with regard to harm and risk. Let us call the notion that
corresponds to chance beneﬁt on the harm side risk harm. The person who
wins a gamble has been exposed to a risk of loss, and that exposure is itself a kind of loss. Her gains from winning the gamble are therefore reduced as a function of the risk she ran of losing rather than winning. Just
as chance beneﬁt is absorbed into outcome beneﬁt when the chance of
beneﬁt eventuates, so the risk of losing is absorbed into the loss when the
risk eventuates in outcome loss. On this view, the person who wins a gamble
is somewhat worse off than his outcome winnings would suggest, due to
the risk of losing to which he was exposed, but the person who loses is not
doubly worse off because in addition to losing, he ran a risk of losing.
I have not attempted anything like a full-ﬂedged defense of the notions of chance beneﬁt and risk harm. But it is nevertheless interesting
to note the implications for the Gautherian pragmatist if these concepts
were viable. Where the chance beneﬁt is large, it would allow a person to
see herself as beneﬁted in some cases, even where she has not secured
any outcome beneﬁt from a given assurance or threat. Those risky plans
would be rational to adopt when the ex ante chance of beneﬁt is large
enough to outweigh the ex post costs of making good on the plan. This
would allow the pragmatist to say that some risky assurances and some
deterrent threats are rational to issue, since in some cases, even if the
threat fails to deter, it would be rational to make good on the threat in
light of the chance beneﬁt that issuing the threat provides. The plan
would thus satisfy the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle. It would also require some adjustment on the winning side, as emerges in the case of
assurances. Some assurances that appear to be rational based on the expected beneﬁt of the winnings will turn out not to be worthwhile, once we
factor in the risk harm, since the agent’s gains must be reduced by the
amount of risk harm to which she is exposed along the way to winning.
Now admittedly it is not easy to see how we would measure such a
thing as chance beneﬁt or risk harm. For one might suppose that the
amount an agent values a chance at receiving a certain outcome beneﬁt
will depend at least in part on highly individualistic reactions agents have
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towards risk. A risk-loving agent will place a disproportionate value on
chance beneﬁt, since in addition to valuing the chance of receiving a
certain outcome beneﬁt, he will also place a positive value on the element
of risk itself. A risk-averse agent, by contrast, may undervalue a risky assurance as compared with the expected beneﬁt of the gamble. She would
presumably discount the expected beneﬁt by the amount of risk the gamble involves, since for her, exposure to risk is in itself a negative feature of
the situation. But on a nonepistemic approach to the concepts of chance
of beneﬁt and risk of harm, there is an objective measure of beneﬁt an
agent receives from a chance of outcome beneﬁt, whether she values that
chance correctly or not. And it is this feature that may allow us to think of
chances and risks as affecting the ultimate value of plans with probabilistic
elements. For the sake of simplicity, let us treat all agents as risk-neutral
agents. For risk-neutral agents, the chance beneﬁt of a gamble is roughly
the value of the beneﬁt she hopes to get out of the gamble, in outcome
terms, discounted by the risk of not getting it.
In order to see how the pragmatic account might be modiﬁed in
light of the notion of chance beneﬁt, let us alter the simple model of an
assurance we have just considered. Suppose once again that Bertram presents Alfred with a .5 chance of assistance. The chance beneﬁt for the agent,
assuming risk neutrality, is the value to him of the increase in outcome beneﬁt he hopes for under the plan, times the probability of receiving these
beneﬁts. In order to test the rationality of the plan, we must consider the
worst payoff the agent could have under it, adding together the outcome
beneﬁt and the chance beneﬁt she could acquire. We should then consider
whether, taking both kinds of beneﬁt into account, the agent would be better off than if she had never adopted the plan at all. Call the “no plan” payoff the agent’s “baseline.”
In this case, the worst scenario for Alfred under the plan would
occur if he were to lose the gamble and proceed to cooperate nonetheless. His outcome payoff would be 1. His chance beneﬁt, however, would
be the chance he had of receiving an increased payoff of 12 over and
above his baseline payoff. The baseline in this case is equal to the payoff
from losing the gamble and then reneging, since Alfred’s payoff under
that scenario is the same as his payoff if neither assists the other, and this
is the outcome if no plan is made. Since his increase would be 7, and he
has a .5 chance of receiving that increase, he has a chance beneﬁt of 3.5.
If we aggregate chance beneﬁt and outcome beneﬁt on the losing side,
his total payoff at the worst outcome is 4.5. We then compare this to how
Alfred would have fared had he never entered into the agreement with
Bertram in the ﬁrst place, and we see that Alfred still fares worse under
the plan in the worst case scenario than he would have fared otherwise,
since without the plan he would have ended up at 5, and with the plan he
will end up at 4.5 if he loses the gamble. If we calculate the risk harm on
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the winning side, we must subtract 1 from his baseline welfare of 5 or 4,
offset by a .5 chance of non-occurrence, to represent a risk harm of 2. The
winning scenario under the plan would therefore give a combined payoff
of 10 ðsee ﬁg. 2Þ.19
But suppose now that the payoffs from winning the gamble are
higher. Let us suppose that if he wins the gamble and proceeds to cooperate, Alfred’s payoff would instead be 20 ðand suppose his payoff from
reneging, were that option available, would be 24Þ, and that if he does
not enter into the agreement, his utility is still 5 and his outcome payoff is
1 if he loses the gamble. Then the chance beneﬁt of the plan would be
.5  ð20 2 5Þ, or 7.5. Adding the chance beneﬁt to an outcome beneﬁt
of 1 should he lose the gamble, Alfred would end up at 8.5 if he loses the
gamble. Since that is better than the 5 he would obtain if he does not
enter into the plan in the ﬁrst place, he would be better off gambling,
even if he loses and has to reciprocate without tangible outcome beneﬁt
from the deal, than if he had never agreed to cooperate with Bertram in
the ﬁrst place.
To be clear about how chance beneﬁt and risk harm work, let us
also consider the value of the winning side of the gamble. There Alfred
would have an outcome beneﬁt payoff of 20, but the payoff must be reduced by the amount of risk harm to which he has been exposed. That risk
is a .5 chance of having to help without receiving help, which would set
Alfred back by 4 as compared with where he would be had he never entered into the agreement in the ﬁrst place. So the risk harm to Alfred is
.5  4, or 2. The risk harm would thus clearly represent a cost to Alfred,
since it is negative relative to Alfred’s baseline. We then reduce the cooperative payoff of 20 by the risk harm of 2, to get a total payoff of 18.
Because under this plan, the agent comes out ahead whether he wins or
loses, the plan is rational to adopt. This is one scenario, then, where a plan
that is not “fully conﬁrmed,” in terms of outcome beneﬁt, passes that test
on the chance beneﬁt model I have suggested.
Where threats are concerned, the analysis is somewhat trickier, but
the basic account is the same. Suppose instead of cooperating, Alfred and
Bertram are in a different situation. Alfred wants to deter Bertram from
applying for a job he hopes to obtain, and so Alfred considers threatening to tell Bertram’s wife that Bertram is having an affair. Suppose further
that if Alfred does threaten Bertram, his threat has a .6 chance of deterring Bertram from applying for the job, and a .4 chance he will be undeterred and will apply for the job anyway. Alfred’s payoff, should he deter
19. Note that we do not have to calculate the chances that we will choose to cooperate
or that we will choose to renege. In this case, the agent is considering the rationality of the
plan that involves cooperation. We therefore assume, ex ante, that the agent will choose
cooperate, rather than renege, when he comes to the choice node.
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Bertram, would be 16. If Alfred fails to deter Bertram, however, and should
Alfred then make good on his threat, he would be left with a payoff of 0.
Suppose also that if he were to defect from his plan of making good on
his threat, Alfred would have a payoff of 5. This is also his payoff if he
had never threatened Bertram in the ﬁrst place and Bertram proceeded
to apply for the job anyway. Finally, there is a small chance ð.2Þ that Bertram will not end up applying for the job, even if Alfred doesn’t threaten
him, in which case Alfred’s payoff will once again be 16. The decision tree
for this plan looks like the representation in ﬁgure 3.
Recall that the chance beneﬁt is the amount of potential increased
outcome beneﬁt an agent has over and above his baseline welfare ðhis wellbeing without the planÞ, multiplied by the probability of his receiving that
increase. The increased payoff for which he hopes under the plan is 16—
the payoff if deterrence succeeds. Here the no-interaction baseline is
spread over two possible outcomes, which we must aggregate. It is .8ð5Þ 1
.2ð16Þ 5 4 1 3.2 5 7.2. So the chance beneﬁt from the plan is 16 2 7.2 5
8.8ð.6Þ 5 5.28. We must now add that to the lowest payoff under the plan
ðzeroÞ to see if the plan is worthwhile. Since the smallest aggregate beneﬁt
Alfred would receive under the plan is 5.28, and it is substantially lower
than his baseline of 7.2, the plan in this case is not rational to adopt.
If we wish to calculate the winning branch of the tree, we must subtract
the risk harm from the outcome payoff of 16. The risk harm is the chance
Alfred has of suffering a loss below his baseline. That baseline, as we said,
was 7.2, and he has a .4 chance of losing the entire amount. We therefore
calculate the risk harm as 7.2 ð.4Þ 5 2.88, and we subtract this from 16 to
get 13.12. This shows that the plan would be worthwhile on the basis of
the winning branch, but not on the basis of the losing one. Since the deliberative requirement demands that the plan provide a net beneﬁt under
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FIG. 3

every reasonably likely outcome, the plan would not be rational to adopt.
Plans involving deterrent threats might be “fully conﬁrmed,” as Gauthier
would say, but the instances will be relatively rare. We might thus provide
symmetrical accounts of chance beneﬁts and risk harms, in a way that
would permit an explanation for why some risky assurances and some deterrent threats are rational to issue. If successful, we would have obviated
the need to explain the rationality of suboptimal actions embedded in optimal plans in terms of more generalized modes of reasoning, such as optimal policies.
VI. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS
While the chance beneﬁt account may derive some support from intuition, the basic thought on which it depends seems difﬁcult to accept: how
can farmer Alfred regard himself as better off plowing Bertram’s ﬁeld without receiving Bertram’s assistance than he would have been had he never
agreed to Bertram’s gamble? Unless an agent is risk loving, there is no reason to suppose she would regard exposure to a gamble as advantageous
per se. Nevertheless, I think the notion of chance beneﬁt may not be as
unintuitive as it at ﬁrst glance appears, and that Alfred may have reason to
regard himself as better off having had the opportunity for gain, despite
the fact that he has lost the wager. Given the objective nature of the concept of probability we are using, Alfred is better off under some risky gambles, whatever his view of it happens to be.
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First, despite the fact that we have rejected the idea that the probabilities involved are merely epistemic, it is nevertheless instructive that
people value risk in different ways. Some people are risk averse, meaning
that they discount the same expected value the greater the element of
risk involved. Other people are risk loving, meaning that it is a beneﬁt
to them that they have a larger potential payoff which is less than certain
to occur, as compared with a smaller certain payoff. These different preferences with respect to risk suggest that people value chances of beneﬁt somewhat distinctly from the way they value beneﬁcial outcomes themselves. In other words, they treat a chance as a separate object of value.
Admittedly, this does not prove the point. For even if the chance of a beneﬁt is seen as a separate item of value, this does not mean that its value is
independent of outcome beneﬁt. A risk-neutral agent values the chance
of a beneﬁt at the expected value of the outcome. But this only means
that such a person has no special preferences regarding chances and risks,
as compared with outcomes. We cannot know from this whether the person treats a chance of beneﬁt as itself a beneﬁt.
The most plausible way to cash out the notion of chance beneﬁt is in
terms of objective notions of frequency. Thus the fact that a person values
risk ought not, in principle, to increase the value of a gamble. Most claims
that chance beneﬁt collapses into outcome beneﬁt will ultimately depend
on epistemic, rather than objective, notions of probability. This for some
will be a sufﬁcient basis for rejecting the notions of chance beneﬁt and risk
harm.20 But there are many adherents of objective notions of frequency,
and while it is beyond the scope of the present paper to argue in favor of
objective over epistemic approaches to probability, siding with such an
account is not a highly controversial move.
Second, there are a number of examples in which the idea that an ex
ante chance of beneﬁt is itself a beneﬁt receives support from intuition.
Suppose someone gives you a lottery ticket as a present. You would tend
to feel that he has beneﬁted you, and you would feel this even if it turned
out not to be the winning ticket. True, the ticket has no further value to
you once you learn it is not the winning one. But this only means that
the beneﬁt that an ex ante chance of beneﬁt confers is “parasitic” on outcome beneﬁt. A chance of beneﬁt, however, may still be a separate form of
beneﬁt, valued in a somewhat different way. Notice, in support of seeing
a lottery ticket as a beneﬁt, that no one would enter actual lotteries if
they only valued tickets at their expected value. For the expected value
of the ticket is lower than its price. But of course this just shows that gamblers are risk loving, which is hardly a surprise.

20. See Stephen Perry, “Risk, Harm and Responsibility,” in Philosophical Foundations of
Tort Law, ed. David G. Owen ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1995Þ, 321–46.
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The strongest support for the thesis, however, emerges if we consider
harm rather than beneﬁt. For it lends credence to the idea of chance
beneﬁt if we can make sense of its converse, risk harm. As it happens, the
law is replete with cases in which courts seem to treat a risk of harm as a
harm. Mass tort cases have often allowed plaintiffs to recover for an exposure to harm, even if no actual injury results. Someone exposed to an
environmental toxin for many years, which has caused others to develop
cancer, may be able to recover purely on the basis of exposure to risk.
This accordingly allows him to recover at the time of exposure, rather
than waiting to see if the risk materializes. The criminalization of reckless
driving may be another example, given that it exists alongside a general
commitment to restricting the use of the criminal sanction to instances
of harm prevention. Of course criminalizing risky activities does help prevent resultant harm. But the same could be accomplished simply by punishing the actual inﬂiction of injury more severely. Still, if we did not perceive imposing a risk as a form of harm inﬂiction, it is not clear we would
be justiﬁed in prohibiting risk-imposing conduct per se.
It may be tempting to think that these cases are actually instances of
holding people liable for violating rights, rather than for inﬂicting harm.
If so, they would not support the intuition that we treat imposing a risk as
tantamount to inﬂicting harm but would instead call for a different kind
of analysis altogether.21 While this thought may have surface appeal, it actually makes little sense. What would be the basis for saying that exposing
someone to a risk violates his rights? What would be the basis for the violation? Presumably it violates someone’s rights to expose him to a risk of
death or serious bodily injury because it threatens to harm him. Should
we not then say that exposing someone to Russian roulette without his consent, for example, violates the victim’s rights because it threatens to harm
him some time in the future, and that, in itself, constitutes a rights violation?
It seems more natural to say that threatening to harm someone in the future may constitute threatening to violate his rights at that future time, and
that the rights violation and the harm seem to go hand in hand, at least
when the harm in question is an impermissible one. Thus it seems more
natural to say that the reason exposing someone to a risk of harm violates
his rights ðwhen it doesÞ is that it constitutes a setback to his interests now,
not just at some point in the future.
Perhaps the most interesting legal cases for our purposes are the medical malpractice cases involving so-called “lost chance of beneﬁt.” Traditionally in order for a plaintiff to recover for injuries in a civil case, he must
be able to show that it was more likely than not that the defendant caused his
injuries. Thus if a patient with a potentially fatal disease was maltreated by
21. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for Ethics for this point.
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a negligent doctor, it might turn out to be difﬁcult for his estate to recover
if he died, since the defendant will always say that the patient would have
died anyway. Courts have increasingly started to say, however, that a patient with a 40 percent chance of survival, whose chances were reduced
to 20 percent by a doctor’s negligence, can recover for the lost chance of
beneﬁt, valued at 20 percent of the extent of his injuries. Since it is not
clear in that case that the doctor caused the plaintiff’s injury, such decisions award compensation for the increased risk of death the doctor imposed, or, alternatively, the decreased chance of cure.
There are, however, several difﬁculties with the concepts of chance
beneﬁt and risk harm. One of the biggest problems is the potentially redundant nature of the beneﬁt. If I receive a chance beneﬁt from exposure to the possibility of winning, and that beneﬁt should be added to the
value of my position once I have lost, then are we not also compelled to
say I have a chance beneﬁt that should be added to my winnings if I were
to win the gamble? Would that not mean that we are engaged in a kind of
double counting, since the winnings are supposed to be the realization of
the chance beneﬁt? If this were the case, the power company that exposes
me to risk of cancer would have to compensate me twice in some cases:
ﬁrst they might owe me compensation for exposure to risk, and then if I
actually develop cancer, they would also have to compensate me for that. It
would follow that the person who developed cancer as the result of a process that was certain to produce cancer would receive less compensation
than the person who was ﬁrst only exposed to a risk and then developed it
later. Since we would normally think of the person who developed cancer
as the result of a sure process as more seriously wronged, rather than less,
this would produce very counterintuitive results indeed.
It was partly in order to avoid results like the foregoing that I claimed
that chance beneﬁt and risk harm are asymmetric with respect to gains
and losses: the value of chance beneﬁt is absorbed into the winnings if
an agent actually wins, and the ðdisÞvalue of the risk harm is absorbed into
the loss if the agent does indeed lose. It is only in the case in which an
agent loses that we should think of the chance beneﬁt as persisting, and
the case in which the agent wins that we should think of the risk harm as
persisting. But what is to justify this asymmetric treatment of chance beneﬁt and risk harm? The thought does not seem as unintuitive as one might
suppose. The idea is that a person who has lost a gamble can regard herself
as somewhat better off for having had the shot at winning. Think of a person who has been turned down for a job for which he was seriously considered, as compared with the person who never was formally considered
in the ﬁrst place. But there seems no intuitive support for the claim that
a person who actually wins can think of herself as better off than even her
actual winnings suggest for having gotten those winnings by chance rather
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than by a certain process. That is, the person who actually gets the job
surely does not think of himself as better off because he was less than certain to receive it. Similarly, a person who has won might regard herself as
in some sense harmed by having been exposed to a risk of harm along the
way to winning. Imagine learning upon disembarking from a plane that
the airline knowingly ﬂew with only one engine. But it would be exceedingly odd to think of oneself as worse off for having lost by a risky process
than by a sure one. The person who is harmed in a car accident presumably does not think of herself as worse off than the person who sustains
the same injuries through an intentional battery.
The notions of chance beneﬁt and risk harm, then, treat the expected
value to an agent of the other branches in a risky plan as relevant to the
value an agent attaches to the branch on which he ﬁnds himself. We assume, that is, that an agent is not entirely indifferent to the manner by
which she comes about her winnings. But this is just to say that the value
agents place on outcomes is in some sense path dependent: the exact
value to an agent of those other branches—of the chance beneﬁt or the
risk harm to which she has been exposed—is not strictly just a measure
of their relation to the outcomes at those branches. And since in our
model, although people can be irrational about the degree to which they
value their winnings or losses, there is a fact of the matter as to the beneﬁt for the agent of the chance of winning and a fact of the matter as to the
harm for the agent of the chance of losing. The degree of beneﬁt or loss
will certainly be parasitic on other things the agent desires—the value she
places on certain outcomes. But whatever the value, we can deﬁne the possibility of beneﬁt on another branch of the plan as itself a beneﬁt, and the
risk of harm on another branch as itself a harm.
I have done my best to defend the related ideas of chance beneﬁt
and risk harm, though, as I have suggested, they must be defended in asymmetric form. While this may seem to cast doubt on the general approach,
there is some intuitive support for the asymmetrical treatment of beneﬁt
and harm. Consider again the case of the lottery ticket. Suppose you have
paid $1 for a lottery ticket in a million dollar lottery, and I then steal the
ticket. If the ticket is not the winning one, presumably I must compensate
you for the price of the ticket, namely $1. That seems a strong intuition
in favor of the idea of chance beneﬁt, for in its absence, we must conclude
that the person who steals what turns out to be a losing lottery ticket owes
no compensation. What, however, do I owe you in the case of a winning
ticket? The possibilities are: ð1Þ a million dollars, ð2Þ a million dollars plus
the price of the ticket, or ð3Þ only the price of the ticket. I take it that
ð3Þ can be summarily eliminated, as drastic undercompensation, so that
our only real possibilities are between ð1Þ and ð2Þ. Now it seems to me it
would be odd to say I owe you a million dollars plus the price of the ticket,
or $1. This would be double counting, given that the price of the ticket is
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only payment for the chance of the million dollars. If you gain a million
dollars on the basis of the $1 ticket, your ticket price is returned to you in
the value of the winnings.
Moreover, if I must pay you a million and one dollars by way of compensation, you get a windfall, since if I had not stolen a ticket that turned
out to be the winning ticket, you would only get a million dollars, not a
million and one. So the only argument we have for saying I owe you a
million and one is by inference from the case in which I steal the losing
ticket. But I have tried to make intuitive that we can treat chance beneﬁt
and risk harm asymmetrically with respect to winning and losing.
A second problem, however, is not solved by adopting the asymmetric approach, namely, the problem of inﬁnite regress. Suppose we count
the chance beneﬁt in the losing payoffs to an agent from a plan, along with
the outcome beneﬁt. Then it looks as though there must be a gamble that
it would be rational for an agent to accept that would give her that combined payoff of chance beneﬁt plus outcome beneﬁt. Let us say the payoff
from this gamble is p 5 c 1 o ðpayoff 5 chance beneﬁt 1 outcome beneﬁtÞ.
There is, however, a beneﬁt to the agent from being able to enter such a
gamble. Let us call this new chance beneﬁt c 0. From that it follows that
there is a p 0, such that p 05 c 0 1 c 1 o. There is a beneﬁt to the agent from
being able to enter the gamble that would give her that payoff, whose payoff is c 00 1 c 0 1 o, and so forth. Now one might be tempted to think this is
not the problem it appears to be. For there can be an entry fee to a poker
game, and by the same token there could be an entry fee to gain membership in a group from which the participants in a poker game might
be chosen, and so on. There is no problem with the idea of chances over
chances. But here the regress is more pernicious. For it means that the
payoffs from the original gamble are not well deﬁned. The payoffs from a
risky plan, say, on the losing branch would be the outcome at that branch,
plus an inﬁnite series of ever-increasing chance beneﬁts. In this case, the
payoff from any gamble would paradoxically be inﬁnitely high if the agent
lost, and inﬁnitely low if the agent won!
While this is a serious objection, it does not compel the rejection of
the ideas of chance beneﬁt and risk harm. Instead, it requires that we reject the idea that chance beneﬁt is something the agent can aim at as part
of the beneﬁt she receives from a risky plan, and that risk harm is something in and of itself that an agent seeks to avoid. That is, while the chance
she had at receiving an outcome beneﬁt is itself a beneﬁt she receives
from a gamble, we cannot think of it as the kind of beneﬁt an agent
would pursue in its own right. Nor can we think of risk harm as a negative
payoff the agent would structure her life to avoid. Strictly speaking, then,
we should probably not think of chance beneﬁt as the sort of thing that
can be added to outcome beneﬁt, since they are beneﬁts of two very different kinds. It is not really part of the payoff from a gamble. If we could
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add them, this would suggest that an agent would agree to trade off a bit
of outcome beneﬁt for some amount of chance beneﬁt, even once the
gamble has been completed. But no rational agent would do such a thing,
and indeed, it is not clear the idea of trading off outcome beneﬁt for
chance beneﬁt can be made coherent. Thus the numbers we have assigned
to measure chance beneﬁt in the illustrations of the chance beneﬁt account offered above are only a heuristic for ﬁguring out which gambles
would be rational and which not.
This last point will undoubtedly leave the notions of chance beneﬁt
and risk harm somewhat elusive. If these are not part of the payoffs from
a gamble, in what sense are they beneﬁts or harms? We have no trouble
saying that to give someone a lottery ticket is to beneﬁt him before the
lottery has been determined. The beneﬁt in question, then, is simply the
kind of beneﬁt that the recipient of a lottery ticket has, but persisting
over time. Once beneﬁted with a chance of winning an outcome beneﬁt,
or harmed with a risk of suffering an outcome harm, we can continue to
think of the person who has received the chance as beneﬁted, and the person subjected to the risk as harmed, even once we know that the chance or
risk has failed to eventuate. In general, the thought is that we are better off
for having opportunities for gain in our lives—that the opportunities are
themselves beneﬁcial—even if those opportunities do not eventuate in favorable outcomes. Similarly, we are worse off for being exposed to the possibility of loss, even if the loss does not eventuate.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is important to be clear about the scope of my conclusion. First and foremost, I take myself to have shown that the pragmatic theory does not deal
effectively with plans involving an element of risk and that despite the apparently compelling distinction between assurances and threats Gauthier
draws in “Assure and Threaten,” no such structural distinction obtains.
From the standpoint of Gauthier’s theory, the distinction between plans
involving an element of risk and plans whose beneﬁts are certain to accrue
is signiﬁcant. This is not surprising: any theory of practical rationality that
requires rational actions to be identiﬁed by their relation to optimal plans,
as opposed to plans with optimal expected utility, will have difﬁculty explaining the rationality of gambles.
Second, I have argued that on an objective approach to probabilities,
articulated in terms of relative frequencies, there is a way of conceiving of
opportunities to beneﬁt as positive additions to an agent’s baseline welfare, as opposed to merely epistemic ði.e., perceivedÞ additions to welfare.
In some probabilistic cases, I have argued, the objective, ex ante chance of
beneﬁt augments the level of outcome welfare that results from a losing
gamble.
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Third, I have suggested that there may be cases in which the chance
beneﬁt is sufﬁciently great, and the level of welfare loss relative to one’s
original baseline is sufﬁciently low, that the chance adjusted welfare on the
losing branch overwhelms the agent’s losses from the decrease in welfare.
I have tried to provide a model of how this might be and to suggest analogies, such as familiar cases of winning a chance to win some outcome
beneﬁt ðexamples might include winning a lottery ticket or admission to a
poker gameÞ that could make sense of this claim about the value of chance
beneﬁt. If such cases exist, some risky assurances would be rational to offer,
just as some deterrent threats are rational to make. And the rationality of
such gambles would not depend on the expected utility the agent gets from
the chance of standard outcome beneﬁt.
Finally, however, we should be clear that even if there are cases of rational risky assurances where the chance beneﬁt makes the plan optimal
even in the absence of outcome beneﬁt, their existence does not necessarily solve the problem of risk that Gauthier identiﬁes in “Assure and
Threaten.” The central difﬁculty is that chance beneﬁt adds only incrementally to the value of a losing gamble. Thus it remains the case that
most losing gambles are not eligible for rational adoption on Gauthier’s
version of the pragmatic theory. Other pragmatic accounts, however, will
either have the same difﬁculty or will suffer from the defect that they fail
to satisfy the Pragmatic Deliberative Principle. Such is the case with Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement approach and other accounts that make use of
nondeliberative mechanisms for plan execution.
It bears noting that pragmatic theories are not truly in worse shape
than expected utility theories in this regard. For any case with the structure we have been considering—where the suboptimal action called for
by the plan is not instrumentally necessary for achieving the beneﬁts from
the plan—will also be one in which it is irrational to follow through on the
plan on standard expected utility theories. Proponents of the standard approach to rationality are admittedly not bothered by this fact. They see
rationality as process constrained in such cases and do not determine
the plausibility of the outcome by the beneﬁts achieved under the plan.
Given that pragmatists all share the intuition that this result counts heavily
against expected utility theory, they are hardly in worse shape under a deliberative version of the pragmatic approach, combined with the chance
beneﬁt and risk harm theses.
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